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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE S'l'ATE OF UTAH.
OCTOBER TERM, 1918.

F. L. BYRON and CHARLES S.
AUS'riN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
vs.

UTAH COPPER COMPANY, a Cor·
poration, JOHN KNUDSON and

No. 3240.

GEORGE C. EARL,
Defendant8 and Appellants.
rtnd

STEPHEN HAYS, Impleaded as an
Additional Defendant.

Appeal from Third Judicial Di8trict Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah, Ilon. Georqe F. Goodwin,Judqe.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS,
This appeal is upon the judgment roll alone.

For

doubtless good reasons (best known to the appellants),
no bill of exceptions has been settled.

Not a line of evi-
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dence is before the court.

Even the opinion of the lower

court (which counsel has printed in their abstract and
weave into the argument), was not made part of the record by a bill of exceptions and has no place in the
abstract.
"Where an appeal is based upon the judgment
roll alone without a bill of exceptions, we therefore have nothing before us except what the statute provides constitutes a part of the judgment
roll.''
Hulse v. Swicegood, 49 Utah 89.
We therefore may strike from consideration and
from the abstract as not part of the record all except:
(a) The amended complaint. (Abstract 22.)
(b)

The answer of Stephen Hays. (Abstract 30.)

(c)

The findings.

(Abstract 54-67.)

(d)

The decree.

(Abstract 67-71.

Of course, as to the appellant and defendant, Utah
Copper Company, its answer is self-serving and does not
constitute evidence in its favor.
It will be observed that the deed in dispute is not in

the record, nor is the mining lea.se and bond referred to
in the discussion part of the re.cord. The mere reference
to Exhibit ''A'' (which purports to be a copy of the mining lease and bond), attached to and made a part of the
answer, does not prove that this is in fact the mining
lease and bond under which plaintiffs claim.

Of course
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the answer exhibits and all is deemed denied under the
statute.
Bearing all this in mind, we may indulge in the wellestablished presumption that the findings were supported
by sufficient competent (perhaps written) evidence introduced at the trial in the absence of any record to the contrary.
Strange as it may seem, however, an examination of
the record will show that appellant's statement of facts
is predicated to a large extent upon the opinion of the
court (which is not a part of the record), and upon its
own answer, which hardly proves itself.
At page 2 of the brief we find reference in the first
paragraph to pages 32, 39 of the abstract.

Page 32 of

the abstract sets ottt defendant's own answer, and at
page 39 is found the opinion which is no part of the

record.
At page 3 of the brief we find

a~

supporting the

claimed facts a reference to pages 32, 35, 36, 37 and 38
of the abstract; these pages contain the answer of the
defendant, Utah Copper Company, and quotations from
an exhibit attached to and which the Utah Copper Company apparently claims is a copy and which it designates as the "mining lease and bond," but there is nowhere in the record any reference which demonstrates
or tends to establish that this Exhibit "A" attached tn
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the answer is in fact the mining lease and bond between
Stephen Hays and F. L. Byron and Charles S. Austin.
With this wholly unauthorized and presumptions
assumption (not based upon the record at all) counsel
proceed to quote from his Exhibit "A" as the lease.
In other words, counsel build up a case based on their
own exhibit (which is not admitted by the plaintiffs and
of which there is no evidence in the record) and daim
error predicated upon such assumption.

ARGUMENT.

I.
With a situation so umque it is somewhat difficult
to follow the brief. \V e !decline to be led into an argument which is wholly academical; and will pursue the
discussion only far enough to demonstrate that there is
not a single assignment of error well taken.

The only

question here, of course, is one of law, since the presumption is that the findings are supported by the evidence.
Hulse v. Swicegood, supra;
Swanson v. Devine, 49 Utah 5;
Roberts v. Bertram, 49 Utah 280;
McGuire v. State Bank, 49 Utah 381.
It is almost impossible to follow the brief of the appellant for the reason that so far from complying with
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Rule 10 there is not in the brief anywhere a reference to
the assignments of error, or a logical discussion of the
errors so assigned.

The assignments of error as found

in the abstract do not comply with Rule 26, and in and of
themselves arc confused and confusing.
Taking them up, these assignments, in their order:
Assignment No. 1-This assignment, which is the
basis of all that follows, attacks. finding No. 11 and complains that the findings is in truth a conclusion of law,
not supported by the other findings.
This

find~ng

No. 11 finds as the ultimate fact:

"That Stephen Hays is the owner of the ore
and minerals in and underneath the surface area
of the property and premises conveyed by him to
the Defendant Earl, and has not sold or conveyed
his estate, right, title or interest therein or thereto, except tmder said lease to the plaintiffs herein.''
The ultimate fact to be found in this case, of course,
is whether or not Stephen Hays

'Was

the owner of the ore

and mineral underneath the surface area.

The Court

found this ultimate fact. The finding as an ultimate fact
is very much the same chara>Cter of finding as in the case
of Smith v. Acker, 52 Cal. 217, referred to and approved
in Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. McCormick et al., 37
Utah, 150. That it is an ultimate fact and so found there
can be no question.

'rhe rule is well established in this

state and in other ;jurisdictions that:
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"If the Court makes a finding of ultimate
facts antd additional findings of probative facts
not shown to be the only probative facts established by the evidence, the judgment rendered in
accordance with the ultimate facts cannot be attacked on the ground that the first findings are not
true because contradicted by the probative facts.''

Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. McCormick,
supra.
Standard Ency. of Proc., p. 1061.
It is perfectly obvious that, for aught the record
shows, this whole controversy may have been determined
by a warranty deed from the Utah Copper Company and
Earl to Stephen Hays, by which these very ores and minerals in express terms were conveyed to Hays; or there
may have been a release or quit claim from the same
parties as part of the same transaction as the transfer
fromllays to Earl. It is suflieieut to say that the record

is silent and the presumption is with the Court's findings.
See Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. McCormiek, supra.
Assignments of error Nos. 2 to 14 are all based upon
the premise that finding No. 11 is unsupported. If finding
No. 11 stands, then, of course, the assignments of error
n~ferred

to are

unfoundC::~d

since these findings complain

of the conclusions of law as not based on any findings ot
fact.

Even if finding No. 1l v1ere not a finding· of an

ultimate fact,-still the other findings in the r0cord with
respect to the intention of the parties at the very tinw the

deed was made, which intention for aught the record
shows to the contrary may have been established by competent written evidence made at the very time,-abundantly supports the conclusions of law.
The assignments of error from 15 to 27, inclusive, all
deal with the insufficiency of the evidence. It is a complete ans\ver to ead1 of these assignments to say that
there is no bill of exceptions and the evid,ence is not before the Court.
As to assignments of error 28 and 29, the assignments are simply that the Court erred in rendering a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Assignments 30 to 33, inclusive, complain of the insufficiency of the evidence.
All these assignments of error, Nos. 15 to 33, inclusive, complain of the oveTruling of the motion for new
trial.

B1tt the motion for new trinl is not made part

of the record by bill of exception and ca;nnot be considered by this cmLrt on appeal.

·while the order overrul-

ing the motion for new trial is part of the judgment roll,
the motion itself is not unless so made by bill of exception.
Imnuance Agency v. Investment Co., 33
Utah 542, at 544.
Moreover,- the assignments of error complain of the
insufficiency of the evidence; but there is no bill of exceptions.
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Assignments 34 to 41, inclusive, in effect complain
that the Court erred in its findings and decree, because
the complaint docs not state facts suffi,cient to constitute
a cause of action.
It will be seem from the above, that after all, the

only substantial assignment of error in the record is
that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Upon
this question -vve might well submit the case for further
discussion.

II.
In view of the record it seems something of an imposition upon the Court to diseuss what must necessarily
be purely academi,c questions. \Vithout any evidence or
even the opinion of the Court before us as part of the
record, any statement of fact must necessarily be based
wholly upon the amended complaint and the findings. The
answer of the appellant cannot aid tlw appellant nor the
exhibit which is made a part of its answer.

Every alle-

gation in the answer so far as the record shows ( and the
presumption is with ns) may have been destroyed by the
evidence adduced.

The only facts before the Court are

the facts admitted by the complaint and the answer of
Stephen Hays, and the fads

as

the Court has found

them. l;Jven the deed does not appear in the record,-its
legal effect only is pleaded. The deed may have contained
broad recitals.

It may havP also included an express

waiver of subjacent support. The lease does not appear
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and the rights only, under such lease, are pleaded. The
case therefore involves merely an analysis of the complaint and findings, and a discussion of the legal propositions arising thereunder.

The Facts as Pleaded and Fo·und.
The complaint and findings here are consistent and
in terms very much alike.

Since the complaint alleges

that the defendants denied plaintiff's right to extract ore
anywhere, from any part of the ground in controversy,
and threatened plaintiffs with bodily injury, it is hardly
necessary to discuss the assignments of error which complain that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.

The complaint pleads the

legal effe.ct of the deed. The findings add to this by showing the intention of the parties; the method· of mining in
vogue; that through :surface mining alone could the
plaintiff derive any benefit or profit from the ore reserved, and the further fact, expressly found, that by the
reservation the parties intended to waive subjacent support. The finding·s set forth the following:

Stephen Hays and wife owned certain prem1ses m
Bingham to which they

gave~

a quit claim deed to the

agent of the Utah Copper Company, expressly reserving,
however, the rig·ht (we give the language of findings No.

•
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2), "to all ores IN AND UNDERNEATH tlw surface
area, together with the right to mine and remove the
same, with the proviso that the mining operations should
not endanger any buildings or improvements then or
thereafter erected on the follmu·ing described portion of
the snrface area so conveyed, by reason af the sinking or

caving of said

surfa,c(~

area caused by such mining opera-

tions, to-wit:"
(Then follows a description of a small rectangular
strip, being the property upon which, if buildings were
erected, they should not be emhngered by caving the surface, this restricted area being thus segregated from the
whole tract, the mineral rights in which were reserved.)
At the time of the

·Conv<~yance

and for a long time

prior this property decd<'d was known to contain valuable
and marketable minerals, particulnrly copper at many
places A'l1 AND 11\DlEDIAri'ELY UNDERNEATH the
surface; and mining operations ha<l been carried on by
employing surface as well as underground methods; and
by taking out aml running all the material of the surface
from the surface dovYmvard;

and

this

was the only

method hy which the mining of ores at or immediately
underneath the surface could be suc,cessfully or profitably carried on.

At the time of the conveyance it was

the intPntion of the parties that the

grantct~

waived any

right whatso(lver to suhjncent support, <'xcept in the rec-
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tangular strip 236 feet long and 100 feet wide, above referred to.
Finding 5, Abs. 58-59.
After the making of the above deed, for the

purposf~

of erecting buildings the Utah Copper Company excavated a very great quantity of material containing copper
of commer·cial value, from the restricted area; piled the
ore or material there taken in two dumps in other portions of the premises conveyed; cribbed it and used part
of the ore as a retaining

"~Nall,

and erected five houses,-

three within the restrieted area, one partially outside and
one wholly outside.

Hays leased to the plaintiffs on a

twenty per cent royalty of the net value of all ore extracted upon condition that lessee should not in mining
endanger any buildings on said premises and would conform to conditions of the reservation in the deed, and
should mine continuously. The lessees prepared to perform. 'rhey commenced with the ore piled in dnmps and
necessarily disturbed the, tCribbing.

The Utah Copper

Company thereupon destroyed their ore chutes and mining appliances and claimed they had no right to remove
any ore, either from tlw dumps or from any part of the
premises; and refused to permit the plaintiffs to remove
any ore from any part of the premises. The ·Utah Copper Company then selected a site (part of the premises
conveyed but wholly outside the restricted area) where
there was a large body of ore immediately underneath
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the surface and built thereon a large and expensive building.

TlH~

11th finding is that Hays, previous to the mak-

mg of the deed and lease, was and ever since has been
the O"\VJH'r of all the ores and minerals undereanth the
surface area of the property conveyed.
The above are all the faets we can glean from the
record.

\Ve find, however, in the brief of ,counsel for ap-

prlla.nts, such additional statements as the following:
"If Hays had the right to disturb the surface
of this ground by quarrying and blasting, etc., to
get the claimed reserved ore, it is sit,rnificant that
no provision was inserted in the deed with respect
to the danger to life and property consequent
thereon." (Appellant's Brief 19.)
It is hardily necessary to remind the court that the

deed is not before the conrt.

There may have been that

very provision in the deed for aught the record shows.
Again :

''The language of the lease is materially

different from that of the reservation in the deed from
Hays to Earl."

(Appellant's Brief 53.)

Just how ap-

pellant established this fact, unless they refer to their
own exhibit and assume that it has been proven simply
because they have pleaded it, we cannot surmise.
Again:
"Extrinsic facts and extraneous parol evidence cannot be allowed to vary the meaning of
the language of that deed or lease." (Appellant's
Brief, page 55.)
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Why counsel assume that these findings were made

on extrinsic pa,rol evidence, in the absence of a bill of
exceptions, we cannot imagine.
So that the case is stripped to the findings, and the
question is simply one of law.

QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED.

We must assume in this discussion that the facts as
found rest upon competent testimony.

It does not mat-

ter therefore whether the testimony be in the nature of a
recital in the deed, or otherwise appear.

We have the

right to rest upon the presumption that the facts as
found were properly found and upon competent testibony.
With these findings, therefore, before the court, the
question of law for discussion may be reduced to the one
proposition:

Parties to a deed have in mind certain

valuable ore bodies which exist at and immediately underneath the surface, which ore bodies are to be retained
and reserved to the grantor.

They know and have in

contemplation the fact that the only and possible way
such ore can be of any use or be profitably or economically
mined is by taking out and removing aU the material in

the surface from the surface downward, and that this
method was not only the sole feasible method, but was
the usual and common practice in mining.

With thet"P
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facts in contemplation they prepared a deed intending
thereby to reserve to the grantor the profit and advantage from mining this ore and intending by their language to waive on behalf of the grantee any right whatsoever to subjacent support, excepting within a small
inner and restricted area on which buildings might be
erected.

With this their intention and all these facts

before they, they express the reservation and their intention in the following language:
''Said grantors expressly reserve to themselves, their heirs and assigns the right to all the
ore IN and UNDERNEATH THE SURFACE AREA of the
property so conveyed together with the right to
mine and remove the same ; providing that such
mining operations shall not endanger any building erected within the following restricted strip of
the property deeded. (The restricted strip upon
which buildings are to be erected is described by
metes and bounds.) ''
In the language used, with the purpose and intent
of the parties, and of surrounding circumstances before
the court, to be construed, so that it will accomplish the
purpose designed, or is the grantor to be deprived of
the advantage contemplated and the intention of the parties defeated 7
From the above certain conclusions are inevitable.
(a)

Hays intended to reserve the minerals.

(b)

Unless subjacent support were waived (while
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the very essence of the transaction included the reservation), it became utterly valueless, and the reservation
meaningless.
(c)

He was willing, however, to give and did give

to the grantee subjacent support for a certain specified
area.
(d)

By some competent evidence it was made to

appear (whether by recitals in the deed or otherwise is
immaterial) that the parties actually intended by the
transaction to waive the right of subjacent support.
To contend under the above state of the record that
the reservation is ''as broad as the grant and therefore
void" is absurd.

The Utah Copper Company got just

what it bargained for.

It had obtained, sacred for its

building purposes, the restricted area in which we were
so far prohibited from mining, that we could not endanger the buildings then or thereafter erected thereon.

It received also surface rights wherever there was not
mineral which would pay to extract; and it got also surface rights when and where Hays did not mine.
wants more.

It now

It denies Hays any mineral rights what-

ever; takes his ore, puts it in dumps and now claims the
ore because (forsooth!) by extracting, it has made it part
of the surface!

And this, too, all contrary to the express

intention of the parties!

And in direct violation of their

moral obligation and solemn agreement.
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As said by the court in Gordon v. Delaware, 97 Atl.
1032:
"That such reservation is not as broad as the
grant is self-evident. It is familiar knowledge that
the right of surface support can be waived by an
implied as well as an express consent; and it is
so implied by the acceptance of a grant offered
upon terms unmistakably intended to extinguish
the right."
Appellants argue in effect:
"The estate passed to Earl was the fee; if
a fee he might build or do with it as he pleased, the
plaintiff therefore had no right to work any surface material. The defendants therefore have the
right of subjacent support."
All of which is a beautiful example of reasoning in
a circle.
fee.

At the outset the deed did not pass the title in
Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah 480, 168 U. S. 573.

Moreover, the deed in express terms reserved the
right to all ore-not only underneath but also all ore in
the surface.

Not only this, but the right to subjacent sup-

port is clearly restricted to the restricted area.

For

the deed reserved to the grantor the right to all ores
in the surface and to remove the same, provided such
mining operations did not endanger buildings and improvements, but only when erected within the restricted
area.

In other words, his operations may endanger all

buildings and improvements outside the restricted area.
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Counsel contend that the words "in the surface"
are to be construed as reading ''ores in the area hereinbefore described and underneath the surface," but to
the contrary both the words "in" and also

neath" are found in the sentence.

"~tnder

Counsel's language

is not found in the deed, but must be implied to secure
their construction.

vV e must transpose--eliminate.

The

deed reads "or in" and also "underneath" the surface.
It is too clear for argument that the words used must

be construed in a sense other than their plain meaning
if appellants' construction prevails.

rro say under such

circumstances that we cannot place the court in the situation of the parties-show their view point at the time of
making the agreement, is to state an absurdity.
"In construing private conveyances it is apparent that each case must be decided upon the
language of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the intention of the grantor,
if it can be ascertained.''
1 Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., Sec. 93, p. 153.
"The only thing, tlwrefore, that tlll' courts
are concernt>d ·with is to ascertain the intentim.: of
the parties to any contract, and, when this is ascertained, the duty to enforce such intention, admits of no escape. A primary canon of construction is to construe the language of the parties
when applied to the subject matter of the contract. The langauge usf•d -vvlH•n applied to the
subject matter must be> given its usnal and ordi-
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nary meaning, unless it is clear that certain words
or terms arc employed in a technical sense. If the
intention of the parties cannot readily be ascertained from the language alone, then the court
must have recourse to the situation, conditions
and circumstances which affected the parties, and
from the language when considered in the light
that those matters afford, determine the real intention of the parties."
Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, at page 82.
'' FJvidcnce as to the condition, situation and
adaptation of land for a particular use, tlw declaration of the parties as to the use to ·which the land
was to be put, and that it had no rental valne for
any other purpose, is aclmissihle, to show the intent of the parties in the use of the phrase 'reasonable~ use.' "
"\Vhcn the mcanin1.~ in an expression in a written contrad is doubtful, it is proper to place the
facts in view of the parties ·when making the ,contract bc> fore the Court, wh0n construing it."
Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162.
It is quite true that when the estate in minerals
sev<~red

IS

from the soil, the ovvner of the latter estate has

the right of subjacent support for the surface. But this
right may he waived either expressly or by implication.
'' Tf apt \Vords arc used, whether in the instrument of severance itself, or in a contemporaneous
or a subsequent instrument, and whether in affirmntiv<' or negative terms, and whether in express
terms, or by plain implication, and whether the
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underlying mines are granted or excepted, and
whether the instrument is voluntary or statutory
the right of support for land in its natural state
may be effectually excluded.''
Paul v. Island Coal Co., 88 N. E. 959.
''The right to surface support may be controUecl by ,contract, however, as where the right to
support is excepted from the grant or reservation
by apt words.''
27 Cyc. at page 790.
"In determining what is included in a grant or
reservation of mineral or mineral rights, the general rules of construction apply; and the old technical distinction between the reservations and exceptions seems to be disregarded to a great extent, the object of the courts being to arrive at and
enforce the intention of the parties.''
27 Cyc. 685.
Even from the language of the reservation, it is perfectly clear that the only surbce support intend,ed was
support for the ground embraced within the restricted
area. The parties contemplated that the snrface should
he sunk or caved outside of this area. The fact that the
grantor was not to sink or cave the surface of the restricted area, clearly indicates that the parties had in
mind that all outside of such area might or would be
'caved in the process of mining.

Counsel seems to con-

tend that presnmptially the words "mining operations"
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imply an excavation in the earth,-subterranean works
of some kind. Such is not the meaning of the term as
construed by this Court.
''From an examination of a large number of
cases we are convinced that the foregoing is a
fair deduction of law upon the subject as declared
by the modern decisions, both of England and this
country. From the foregoing, it thus seems clear
to us that where we find the terms "mines and minerals" used in grants or in reservations, in instruments of conveyance, in statutes or eonstitutions,
under the modern construction, the former is not
limited to mere subterranean exacavations or workings, nor is the latter limited to the metals or
metalliferous deposits, whether contained in veins
that have well-defined walls or in beds or deposits
that are irregular and are found at or near the surface or otherwise.''
Nephi PlastPr Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah
114.
In Hext v. Gill, L. R. (7 Cha. App. 699) the languag·e
was
''Reservation was all mines and minerals within and under the premises with full liberty to dig,
search for, take and work the said excepted mines
and minerals.''
Held, that a bed of decomposed granite constituted
minerals and was within the meaning of the reservation
and the grantor was permitted to remove the bed by open
quarrying. This method of mining, of course, destroyed
the surface in that part vYhere the mineral was located,

~1

yet it was held that the right to surfa,ce support had been
waived.
In Earl of Rosse v. Wainman, (14 :Messon &

~Welsby,

859; 2 Exch. 800) 10 Morrison Mining Reports, 398, tlw

reservation was of "all mines and minerals," with the
right to dig, sink, search for and work said mines and minerals, provided that the grantors in searching for and
working the said mines and minerals should keep the first
layer or stratum of earth separate and apart by itself
without mixing the same with the lower strata. The grant
w.as in

th(~

form of an enclosure act taking certain waste

lands away from the lord and alloting thrm to commoners.

A stratum of building stone was found just below

the surface and under the reservation the surfaee soil was
removed to a great extent and the stratum of stone taken
out by quarrying. It was held that this was permissible
under, and contemplated by, the reservation.
''The methods of mining pursued (1epend upon
the location of the deposit, the eharact<~r of the
mineral, its value, the natm·p of the rock in whidt
it is embedded, and the extent and position of the
deposit. ~When tlw mineral is exposP<l at the surface, or is covere<l only hy a shallow layer of soil,
quarrying iR rC'sorted to.''
Bnrdiek v. Dillon, 144 Fed. 7:37, at p. 7::m.
In N. Pa<:>. R. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S., p. 5:10,
tlw Court says:
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"Nor do we approximate much more closely
to the meaning of the word by treating minerals as
substances which are 'mined,' as distinguished
from those which are 'quarried,' since many valuable deposits of gold, copper, iron and coal lie
upon or near the surface of the earth, and some of
the most valuable building stone, such, for instance,
as the Caen stone in France, is excavated from
mines running far beneath the surface. The distinction between underground mines and open
workings was expressly repudia,ted in Midland
Ry. Co. v. Haunchwood Co., L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 552,
and in Hext v. Gill, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 699."
In Graff v. Scranton Coal Co., Pa., 91 Atl. p. 508, the
reservation excepted and reserved all the coal and minerals beneath the surface" with the sole right to mine and
remove the same by any subterranean process incident
to the business of mining--without thereby incurring in
any event whatever any liability for injury caused or
damage done to the surface of said lot or to the buildings or improvements which now or hereafter may be put
thereon." Then followed a discharge from any liability
for any injury that may result to the surface of said
prem1ses.
In Kellert v. Rochester etc. Co., Pa., 74 Atl. 789, the
words used are as follows:
''And the parties of the first part do hereby
release all and every daim or claims for damages
to the said land caused by operating or workings
of said mines, in a proper manner."

_.,

()•)

UndPr such conveyanf:e it was held that the right to
surface support had been waived and that all the coal
could bP mined, whether the surface caved or not. 1n the
case at bar the grantor reserved ''all ores in and under-

neath th<~

~;ur[aee

nr<>a, together with the right to mine and

remove tht> same, provided said mining operations shall
not endanger any buildings or improvements now or hereafter erected on a portion of the surface are hereinabove
described hy reason of the sinking or ,caving· of the surface of said area caused by said mining operations." If

all of the ore in the surface area and undenwath tlw surface area was reserved to the grantor and if it is necessary to take out that in tlw surface by surface mining
or quarrying and the grantor should he

rPfus<~d

this

method, and be compelled to give surfaee support to all
outside the

n~strietod

area, then the resPrvatiou it' of lit-

tle value and meaning.
In Griffing v. Fairmont Coal Co., \V. Va., 2nd L. R.
A. (N. S.) it is held:

"vVhere a deed conveys the coal under a tract
of laud togdher with the right to enter upon and
under said land, awl to mim~, ex,cavate, and remove all of it, thf~re is no implied reservation in
such an instrument that the grante<~ must leave
enough coal to support the surface in its original
position.''
This case reviews many of the authorities and is a
leadina: cnsc on the qnestion here involved. 'Vhile it has
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been criticised by some cases, such as Piedmont etc. Co. v.
Kearney, Md., 79 At. 1913, Collins v. Gleason Coal Co.,
Iowa, 115 N. vV. 497, Stone Gap Colliery Co. v. Hamlin,
89 S. FJ. 305, vVelch v. Kansas Fuel Co., Kan., 137 Pac.
941, still it can easily be distinguished. from those cases
and the reasoning in the •case is no doubt sound.

The

preceding four cases and the cases of Griffin v. Fairmont
Coal Co., supra, exhaustively discuss the authorities of
subjacent support.

In Coon v. Fairmont Coal Co., 179

Fed. 191, the Federal Court follows the decision of the
state court on the theory that it is a rule of property and
should be followed, and says, at page 210:
"We are not unmindful of the fact that the
decision of the courts of England and many of the
courts of this country are not in harmony with the
decision of the court in vV est Virginia. N evertheless, we find ourselves impelled to the conclusion
that this differenc(~ is on account of the peculiar
facts involved in this case, and not because of the
proposition of law announced by the courts to
which we refer.''
See also Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.,

61 At. 559;
Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. St. 15.
As heretofore suggested we refuse to be drawn into
a discussion of the deli-cate distinctions which have been
made and the criticism which has arisen concerning the
Griffin case (supra). It may well be that the note to 41
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L. R. A. (N. S.) is sound. Standing alone, with the actual
intent not disclosed, particularly in states w hc~re the old
rule as to the meaning of "mines and minerals" obtains
It does not

the Griffin case may be wrong,-or right.
affect the result here.

~Ve

think, perhaps, the rule ought
181 N.Y. 178; 7:) N.

to be as stated in Brady v. Smith

E. 9G3, which appellant thinks is "a case mnch in point."
(App. Brief 15.)

There the words

W<~re:

"All mines and minerals which 1nay be frmnd
on the above piece of ground.''
The Court says:

"It appears in the fhzdinr;s that immense
boulders and ledges of limestone crop ont on the
surface of these premises; and it ·would be a
strained and unnatural construction to assume that
the language commented upon above r·efers to stone
lying open to view. * * '~ It is thus apparent
that each case must be decided u-pon the lan[Jttage
of the grant, the surroundin~q circ1tmstances and
the intention of the grantor if it can be ascertained.''
Here, there can he no question as to

thf~

ore referrPd

to: the surrounding circumstances arP shown; and thP
intention of the parties is clearly made to appear.
In this case. there is an express finding

that

the

patries intended to waive subjacent snpport. The trial

cmtrt had the deed before ·it and this appellate court can
only guess at its contents.

ALL

oF

TH1~

ci-rcumstances

were before the trial court showing the attitude of the
parties. In finding this intention it was the duty of the
trial court (presumably performed) to take,-not merely
the dry words used,-not merely the language of the
reservation, but to compare every part of the enlire instrument so that while endeavoring to give every substantive part operative effect, also to give it a practical
rather than a theoretical application.

The constrUtCtion

should be upon a view of the attitude of the parties making it. How, with the deed absent from the record, with
the only basis the finding itself may this court assume that
the evidence· from the entire deed does not justify this
finding? It is no answer to say that the instrument was
a deed, nor that it was a quit-claim deed. It was in many
respects not a usual or stereotyped instrument, but one
prepared in view of the peculiar conditions.
Considering the findings and the absence of any bill
of exceptions, the language of the Circuit Court of Appeals of this circuit is peculiarly applicable.
"Plaintiff's counsel have displayed marked
research into the nice distinctions respecting the
creation of qualified estates, and rest the case
laregly upon the rigidity of some tenchinacl rules
of construction touching such deeds to real property. \V e will not undertake to review all the authorities cited, as the discussion would be more
academic than useful. There is in the interpretation and construction of written instruments no

more marked t~ndency of the judicial mind than
to get at directly what was the real thought and
purpose of the maker of the instrument. \Vlwn
the language and terms employed arc explicit, or
have a gt>nerally a,cceptcd meauing, or, as appli,~d to
the subject matter, have acquired a tee]mienl application, the letter of tlw written instrmneut must
control. But when the language is ambiguous or
vague, or the terms employed erPate n~1wmwhle
uncertainties as to what \VUS the actual intent of
the grantor, no safer rule can obtain than to place
ourselves, as near as may he, in the precise situation of th0 person at the time of the execution of
the instrunH:•nt, arHl read and apply every part of it
as a whole, and thus dis,coverin,'r, \dlat the real mind
of the party was, to follow that to ib praetieal eonelusion. The Court tbat uoes this will SPldom go
~wrong, and will measurably avoid the offens(~ of
making and enforcing eontraets rww•r assented to
by tht• partie's signing th0m. This thought is aptly
expressed in ~Walsh v. Hill, 38 Calif. 481:
" 'In the construction of written instruments
we have never derived much aid from the technical
rules of the books. The only rule of much value
-one which is frequently shadowed forth, but
i:ieldom, if ever, expressly stated in tbc hooks-is
to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the
seats whieh were oecupied by the parties at the
time the instrument was executed; then, by taking
it by its four eorncrs, read it.'

"It may be regarded as the recognized rule>
that in the exposition of grants and contracts tlte
eonstruction should be upon the view of the attitude of the person making them, and ?qJOn a com-
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parison of every part of the entire instru-ment, so
that, while endeavoring to give every substantive
pa.rt operative effect, also to gtive it a practical
rather than a theoretical application. Devl.
Deeds, 837, 855; vV olfe v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 545, 8
S. W. 551; Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns 387. And
when the intention is apparent, without repugnance to the settled rules of law, it will control
the technical terms; 'for the intention, and not
the words, is the sense of any agreement.' And
this will prevail 'regardless of inapt expressions
or carless recitation.' Collins v. Lavelle, 44
Vt. 233; Carson v. McCaslin, 60 Ind. 337; Rockefeller v. Merritt, 40 U. S. App. 666, 22 C. C. A.
608, 76 Fed. 909, 913; In re Bomino 's Estate, 83
Mo. 433, 441."
Speed v. St. Louis M. B. T. R. Co., 86 Fed.

235, 237.

III.
But on what theory can the defendants, as a matter
of good law or good morals, claim the ore which was
placed in the

dumps~

This ore, by the express terms of

the reservation, belonged to the grantor.

If any build-

ings erected in the restricted area were endangered by
its removal, of course this practical difficulty would prevent its removal.

But this is only if and while required

to remain for support.

The defendant, however, having

removed it, and the necessity for its use as surface sup-

()()
_,;

port having ceased, the defendants now claim the ore as
ore and a right in addition to the support of this ore,

beca,use the ore is placed on the ,~urface. In other words,
they created a new surface and seek to hold the new surface sacred and the ground beneath it.

Under the same

theory the defendants might take every pound of ore that
is in or underneath the surface, though the same extended
to the very center of the earth, heap it mountain high,
and then claim an equal distance below surface as support for it.
The language of the reservation under the f1ndings is
clean-cut-the grantors are entitled to all ores in and
underneath the surface of all the property so conveyed.
They are entitled to the right to mine and remove the
same; but such mining operatitns must not endanger any
building or buildings then or thereafter erected on the
restricted area.

The removal of this ore docs not en-

danger any building, it had been dug out long before, and
its removal would not in any sense jeopardize any of the
buildings.
Counsel say (App. Brief 23):

"How did appPl-

lant 's leveling off the ground and depositing thP matl'rial
elsewhere pass any title to the material to the respondents 1''

t,ion.
terial~

The title passed to Hays' lessee by the reserva"\Vhen did the appellant secure title to this maIf all of the surface could be removed without
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endangering the buildings on the restricted area, every
pound of ore (and, by ore we mean material containing
mineral of marketable value), belonger to the plaintiffs
in this case.

The deed did not contemplate and was not

intended to give to the defendants any mineral rights.
All of their rights are subject to the reservation that the
grantor has the right to take the ore which may be in
the surface, and also the ore underneath the surface
throughout the entire deeded area, except to the extent
that buildings may be endangered by the removal of the
surface wtihin a certain restricted area.

IV.
Counsel complain that we injured the cribbing.

If

A steals the property of B and puts a fence around it,
ean he complain because B in the retaking injures the
fence~

The injury to the cribbing involved no act other

than such as by the contract of the parties Hays was permitted to do.

If he had (outside the restricted area) the

right to cave the surface-then the defendant took its
own chances in building where such caving would cause
it injury.

The baldest, most deliberate and most lawless

act eharacterizing the defense in this case was the
erection by the defendant of a large, expensive house
outside the restricted area directly over a large and valuable ore body.

And this work was done while the liti-
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gation was in progress and while the parties were (presumably) determining their rights in the courts.
The decree of the court below should be affirmed with
costs.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLARD HANSON,
SHIRLEY P. JONES,
Attorneys for F. L. Byron, Charles S. Austin, Respondents.
B0011 H, LEE, BADGER & RICH,
Attorneys for Steven Hays, Impleaded Defendant
and Respondent.

